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LABOR IN THE TRUMP YEARS
Charlotte Garden ∗
INTRODUCTION
Once Donald Trump is inaugurated, American labor unions will be faced
with the most hostile federal government in decades. Assuming Trump is able
to nominate and have confirmed one or more Supreme Court Justices, all three
branches of government, including both houses of the legislature, are likely to
be unremittingly hostile to organized labor. Allow this to sink in for a moment:
Beginning in 2017, the federal government will be more universally hostile to
the interests of unions and their allies than that of August 5, 1981, when
President Reagan fired 11,000 striking air traffic controllers and imposed a
lifetime rehire ban, 1 breaking the controllers’ union and modeling aggressive
anti-union tactics to employers nationwide. 2 And it will be more hostile than
the federal government that existed on June 23, 1947, when the Taft-Hartley
Act—which had been denounced by labor unions as a “slave labor” bill 3—
became law over President Truman’s veto. 4 And it will be more hostile than
the federal government that existed on May 16, 1938, when the Supreme Court
held that employers were free to permanently replace economic strikers, 5
guaranteeing employers’ leverage in bargaining. 6
Each of these examples shows how a single branch of the federal
government can hamper labor unions’ effectiveness. Imagine what they can do
when no other branch is likely to act as a check. Moreover, while Trump did
∗
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Andrew Glass, Reagan Fires 11,000 Striking Air Traffic Controllers Aug. 5, 1981, POLITICO, Aug. 5,
2008, http://www.politico.com/story/2008/08/reagan-fires-11-000-striking-air-traffic-controllers-aug-5-1981012292.
2 See Michael H. Leroy & John H. Johnson IV, Death by Lethal Injunction: National Emergency Strikes
Under the Taft-Hartley Act and the Moribund Right to Strike, 43 ARIZ. L. REV. 63, 66 (2001); Joseph A.
McCartin, Collision Course: Ronald Reagan, The Air Traffic Controllers, And The Strike That Changed
America (2011).
3 See Nelson Lichtenstein, Taft-Hartley: A Slave-Labor Law?, 47 CATH. U. L. REV. 763, 766 (1998) (“In
giant rallies of protest and petition, both the AFL and the CIO unfurled huge banners denouncing Taft-Hartley
as a “Slave-Labor Act.”).
4 H.R. 3020, 80th Cong. (1947) (passing Labor Management Relations Act, also known as the TaftHartley Act, over Truman’s veto).
5 See, NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
6 Id.
1
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not run on a campaign message of undermining labor unions, the interests of
the Republican Party and the interests of unions are clearly opposed. Because
organized labor today mostly supports Democratic candidates with their
political spending and get-out-the-vote efforts, anything that weakens unions
or depletes their coffers helps Republicans. 7 Thus, even though Trump himself
is unpredictable, 8 it is readily apparent that he will surround himself with union
opponents.
This essay proceeds in two parts. Part I contrasts the situation in which
many union leaders and supporters expected to find themselves with respect to
the federal government on November 9, 2016, with the emerging reality of a
Trump administration. Part II suggests some priorities that the labor movement
might pursue, notwithstanding the likely actions of the federal government.
I. THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT IN THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION:
EMERGING REALITIES
The last eight years of federal labor policy have been largely shaped by the
measured pro-labor stances of the NLRB and Department of Labor; a hostile
Congress, particularly once Democrats lost control of the Senate in 2015; and
courts that have been increasingly willing to defer to federal agencies actions
as President Obama has filled appellate court vacancies—but a hostile
Supreme Court. 9 Had Hillary Clinton been elected president, unions and
workers could have expected more of the same, with the important addition of
at least one liberal-leaning Justice to the Supreme Court. This state of affairs
would not have revolutionized the environment in which unions operate, but it

7 See, Daryl Levinson & Benjamin I. Sachs, Political Entrenchment and Public Law, 125 YALE L.J. 400,
436 (2015).
8 See, Ian Kullgren, Trump Called for Eliminating the Federal Minimum Wage. He Also Called for it to
Be Raised., POLITICO, Oct. 4, 2016, http://www.politico.com/blogs/2016-presidential-debate-fact-check/2016/
10/trump-kaine-minimum-wage-229149.
9 See, Lawrence Hurley, Obama’s Judges Leave Liberal Imprint on U.S. Law, Reuters, Aug. 26, 2016,
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-court-obama-idUSKCN1110BC. The change in the federal courts
should not be overstated, as several appeals courts remain dominated by conservative jurists. In particular, the
Fifth and Eights Circuit Courts of Appeals have emerged as preferred forums for litigants seeking to invalidate
Obama administration initiatives. For example, challenges to the Department of Labor’s persuader rule and
overtime rule were filed in district courts within those circuits, with a district court within the Fifth Circuit
issuing a “nationwide” injunctions against the rule. Nat’l Fed. of Independent Business v. Perez, Case No.
5:16-cv-66-C, 2016 WL 3766121 (W.D. Tex. June 27, 2016). Conversely, President Obama has made four
appointments to the District of Columbia Circuit, in which many challenges to agency actions are filed; that
court now has seven judges appointed by Democratic presidents, and four appointed by Republicans. As a
result, that court is now considered to be more likely to defer to federal agencies than it was in the recent past.
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would have allowed for steady improvements in labor standards; a
continuation of the NLRB agenda discussed in the next section; and a Supreme
Court that would maintain the status quo regarding union dues and fees and
generally uphold regulatory changes. As discussed below, these advances are
likely to come to an abrupt halt in the Trump administration.
A. The NLRB 10
In accordance with recent tradition, 11 the NLRB under President Obama
leaned Democratic, 12 and accordingly was more amenable to taking a broad
view of workers’ collective action under the NLRA than Republican-leaning
Boards. At least three themes have emerged during the Obama years at the
NLRB.
First, the Board has responded to the “fissured workplace,” taking a more
pragmatic view of which enterprises may be required to bargain with which
employees. For example, the Board adopted a more flexible test to determine
when an enterprise qualified as a joint employer, considering not just the
authority that an enterprise actually exerts over workers, but also authority held
in reserve. 13 Similarly, the Board held that “leased” workers could be included
in a bargaining unit with their singly employed co-workers over their
employers’ objections, recognizing that these workers share common interests
regarding the terms and conditions of employment that the common employer
sets. 14 And, the Board’s General Counsel, Richard Griffin Jr., invited the
10 This section focuses on the National Labor Relations Board and not the Department of Labor.
However, the Department of Labor enforces labor law’s union reporting requirements. See, Office of LaborManagement and Standards, Department of Labor https://www.dol.gov/olms/ (describing Department of
Labor’s role in enforcing the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act). Thus, in a Trump
administration, unions may see increased scrutiny of their finances and reporting compliance. Additionally, the
Department of Labor is likely to retract key employee-friendly guidance documents, and to pursue fewer
investigations of alleged wage and hour violations. See, Administrator’s Interpretation No. 2015-1, The
Application of the Fair Labor Standards Act’s “Suffer or Permit” Standard in the Identification of Employees
Who are Misclassified as Independent Contractors, July 15, 2015, available at https://www.dol.gov/whd/
workers/misclassification/AI-2015_1.htm.
11 Joan Flynn, A Quiet Revolution at the Labor Board: The Transformation of the NLRB, 1935–2000, 61
OHIO ST. L.J. 1361, 1365 (2000) (“since 1970 a majority of the Board members appointed have come from
management or union-side rather than neutral backgrounds”).
12 See, NLRB, Board Members Since 1935, https://www.nlrb.gov/who-we-are/board/board-members1935.
13 Browning-Ferris Inds. of CA, 362 NLRB No. 186 *2 (2015) (“We will no longer require that a joint
employer not only possess the authority to control employees’ terms and conditions of employment, but also
exercise that authority.”) (emphasis in original).
14 Miller & Anderson, Inc., 364 NLRB No. 39 *8 (2016) (adopting rule “not requiring employer consent
to units combining jointly employed and solely employed employees of a single user employer”).

GARDEN GALLEYSFINAL

98

1/12/2017 8:21 AM

EMORY CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REVIEW [Vol. 4

Board to consider when franchisors are joint employers with their franchisees,
pursuing a high profile set of charges against McDonald’s. 15
Second, the Board interpreted the statutory definitions of “employer” 16 and
“employee” 17 more capaciously than recent Republican boards, allowing more
workers to engage in protected concerted activity including collective
bargaining. Thus, in a case involving Columbia University, the Board recently
held that graduate student workers qualified for protection under the NLRA;18
those students quickly voted in favor of union representation. 19 Likewise, the
Board articulated a new and more expansive test to determine when university
faculty qualify as employees rather than managers, and a new approach to
determining when faculty at religiously affiliated colleges and universities
must be excluded from the Act’s protection. 20 However, as with the
McDonald’s case, the Board’s work in this area will not be completed by the
time Trump takes office: of particular note, cases regarding the status of gig
economy workers remain pending at the trial level. 21
Third, the Board and the General Counsel actively enforced the NLRA
rights of non-union workers. The General Counsel made it a priority to
prosecute cases concerning overbroad work rules that infringed employees’
rights to engage in protected concerted activity, including rules forbidding
workers from discussing their pay or from criticizing their employers on social
media. 22 Moreover, the Board issued a series of decisions invalidating
contracts requiring employees to commit to individual arbitration in lieu of
class or collective actions in either judicial or arbitral forums. 23 This rule was
upheld by two circuits (though it was rejected by three others); 24 its
significance is evidenced by the fact that both cases in which the rule was
15 E.g., McDonald’s USA, NLRB Case No. 13-CA-147150. These cases remains pending before an
administrative law judge, and therefore will not be decided by the NLRB before President-Elect Trump takes
office.
16 29 U.S.C. § 152(2).
17 29 U.S.C. § 152(3).
18 Trustees of Columbia University, 364 NLRB No. 90 (2016).
19 Elizabeth A. Harris, Columbia Graduate Students Vote Overwhelmingly to Unionize, NY TIMES, Dec.
9, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/09/nyregion/columbia-graduate-students-union-vote.html?_r=0.
20 Pacific Lutheran University, 361 NLRB No. 157 (2014).
21 E.g., Uber Techs., Inc., NLRB Case No. 20-CA-160720.
22 E.g., Report of the General Counsel Concerning Employer Rules, 2015 WL 1278780 (Mar. 18, 2015).
23 D.R. Horton, Inc., 357 NLRB No. 184 (2012); Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 361 NLRB No. 72 (2014).
24 Morris v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 834 F.3d 975 (9th Cir. 2016) (upholding NLRB rule); Lewis v. Epic
Sys. Corp., 823 F.3d 1147 (2016) (upholding NLRB rule); D.R. Horton, Inc. v. NLRB, 737 F.3d 344 (5th Cir.
2013); Owen v. Bristol Care, Inc., 702 F.3d 1050 (8th Cir. 2013); Sutherland v. Ernst & Young LLP, 726 F.3d
290 (2013) (rejecting NLRB rule without discussion).
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upheld involved plaintiff employees who invoked it in cases brought under
statutes other than the National Labor Relations Act. That is, this rule
facilitates meaningful enforcement of a range of workplace rights that would
otherwise be lost because—even assuming individual arbitration is less
expensive than individual litigation—too little money is at stake in many
workplace claims to make retaining counsel for individual arbitration
financially viable. 25
Still, and contrary to the claims of some Republican legislators and
employer-leaning groups, the relatively labor-friendly Obama NLRB did not
make radical changes to labor law. While there are likely a host of mutually
reinforcing reasons for this (including the Board members’ fidelity to the
NLRA), one reason was undoubtedly the checks imposed by a hostile
Congress. Those included a raft of hearings not just on the NLRB’s
decisions, 26 but also the General Counsel’s charging decisions; 27 threats to defund the Board; 28 and routinely blocking the President’s NLRB nominees, both
through the usual channels and by preventing recess appointments through pro
forma congressional sessions. 29 Further, although the much-discussed
downward slide in union density slowed to a near stop—possibly due in part to
the Board’s decisions—union density did not begin to increase. 30
Thus, while it is likely that—once constituted 31—a Trump board will
reverse several Obama Board decisions, those reversals are unlikely to
significantly undermine the labor movement as a whole. However, the Board
25 See Martin H. Malin, The Three Phases of the Supreme Court’s Arbitration Jurisprudence:
Empowering the Already-Empowered, 17 NEV. L.J. 23, 59 (2016).
26 E.g., Culture of Union Favoritism: Recent Actions of the National Labor Relations Board, Sept. 22,
2011, http://edworkforce.house.gov/calendar/eventsingle.aspx?EventID=260180.
27 See, e.g., Keith Laing, NLRB Lawyer: Boeing Complaint ‘Not Intended to Harm’ Workers, THE HILL
June 17, 2011, http://thehill.com/policy/transportation/167159-nlrb-lawyer-boeing-complaint-not-intended-toharm-the-workers-of-sc.
28 See, e.g., Christina Marcos, GOP Lawmaker Proposed Defunding NLRB, THE HILL May 18, 2015,
http://thehill.com/blogs/floor-action/house/242387-gop-lawmaker-proposes-defunding-nlrb.
29 NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S.Ct. 2250 (2014) (invalidating President Obama’s recess appointments
to the NLRB).
30 Melanie Trottman, Membership Rate Falls for U.S. Unions in 2014, WALLSTREET JOURNAL, Jan. 23,
2015, http://www.wsj.com/articles/membership-rate-falls-for-u-s-unions-in-2014-1422028558.
31 There are presently two open seats on the NLRB; recent history suggests Trump will nominate two
Republicans to fill them. Further, the General Counsel’s term expires in November 2017, and Trump is likely
to nominate a replacement with much different priorities. These positions require the consent of the Senate, but
with only a simple majority vote. Paul Kane, Reid, Democrats Trigger ‘Nuclear’ Option; Eliminate Most
Filibusters on Nominees, WASHINGTON POST, Nov. 21, 2013, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/
senate-poised-to-limit-filibusters-in-party-line-vote-that-would-alter-centuries-of-precedent/2013/11/21/
d065cfe8-52b6-11e3-9fe0-fd2ca728e67c_story.html?utm_term=.b5e3f5867593.
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may pursue other priorities that have a greater deleterious effect on labor. For
example, conservative groups have in recent years urged the Board and the
courts to take a broader view of what groups qualify as “labor organizations”
under the NLRA, which are subject to a suite of disclosure requirements as
well as limitations on secondary and recognitional striking and picketing. 32
Similarly, the Board may expand the scope of Section 8(c) of the NLRA,
which protects employers’ speech rights; and take a more expansive view of
what activity qualifies as secondary picketing, limiting a key tool in the labor
movement’s arsenal.
B. The Federal Courts
The Supreme Court headline of 2016 was Justice Scalia’s death, and the
Court’s subsequent deadlock on a list of highly contested cases. One of those
cases was Friedrichs v. California Teachers Association, in which the
plaintiffs argued that public sector employees have a First Amendment right
not to pay union dues or fees. 33 Justice Scalia was widely expected to vote with
the four other conservative members of the Court in the plaintiffs’ favor; if this
had happened, Friedrichs would have represented the culmination of a multidecade litigation and advocacy effort to weaken unions and constrain their
participation in electoral politics by allowing represented public sector workers
in every jurisdiction to decline to contribute towards the costs of union
representation. 34
With President Obama’s nomination of Judge Merrick Garland of the
District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals to fill Justice Scalia’s seat,
unions probably thought they could breathe a sigh of relief. But obstruction by
Senate Republicans means that—barring an effective filibuster by Senate
democrats—President Trump will fill Scalia’s seat and possibly others as well.
When that happens, it is a virtual certainty that the Court will grant cert. on
another public sector union dues case, and decide it adversely to the union. The
only question then will be how much farther the Court is willing to go. Antiunion advocacy groups have already begun advancing arguments that
exclusive representation (the principle that a duly-elected union represents all
of the employees in a bargaining unit) is unconstitutional as to certain public
32 See Mike Emanuel, Unions by Another Name? Lawmakers Question Rise of ‘Worker Centers’, FOX
NEWS Jul. 27, 2013, http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2013/07/27/unions-by-another-name-lawmakersquestion-rise-worker-centers.html.
33 Friedrichs v. Cal. Teachers Ass’n, 136 S.Ct. 1083 (2016).
34 See Cynthia Estlund, Are Unions a Constitutional Anomaly?, 114 MICH. L. REV. 169, 179 (2015).
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workers; and that unions representing public sector workers may not offer
membership incentives or restrict voting rights to members. 35 These
arguments, if accepted by the Court, would simultaneously worsen the impact
of a decision barring public sector agency fees by making it more difficult for
unions to incentivize voluntary payments; and make it more likely that even
union-friendly states will bar groups of workers from collective bargaining,
because exclusive representation is critical to promoting stability within a
system of collective bargaining.
Finally, while perhaps less high-profile than cases concerning the rights of
public sector union objectors, the Court may also hear other cases about
substantive aspects of labor law. Among those, the leading candidates involve
the NLRB’s individual arbitration rule; cert. petitions in Epic Systems and
Ernst & Young are now pending. 36 Another—though a less likely—candidate
is UAW v. Hardin County, in which the Sixth Circuit held that “right to work”
laws enacted at the municipal level were not preempted by the National Labor
Relations Act. 37 If the Supreme Court hears the case and upholds the Sixth
Circuit, then Republican-controlled municipalities in Democratic-controlled
states will have the ability to adopt their own “right to work” laws, unless
barred by state law.
C. Congress
Finally, unions will continue to face a hostile Congress, with PresidentElect Trump unlikely to veto anti-labor legislation. Thus, a bill to include
“right to work” provisions in both the NLRA and the RLA to—similar to bills
proposed during the 114th Congress 38—would not need to overcome a
presidential veto in order to become law. Similarly, the National Labor
Relations Board may face significant funding cuts from Congress, rendering it
unable to prosecute many unfair labor practices.

35

I have elsewhere discussed these and other legal theories in more detail. See Charlotte Garden, The
Deregulatory First Amendment at Work, 51 HARV. C.R-C.L. L. REV. 323 (2016).
36 Docket, Case No. 16-285; Docket, Case NO. 16-300.
37 United Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers of Am. v. Hardin Cty., 842 F.3d 407 (6th Cir.
2016).
38 H.R. 6121 (114th Congress); S. 391 (114th Congress).
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II. CONCLUSION: LOOKING AHEAD
With what is almost certain to be unremitting hostility from the federal
government ahead, unions are likely to turn to blue states to continue to press
for improvements in minimum labor standards and to organize workers in the
public and private sectors. 39 In particular, the Fight for Fifteen movement,
backed by the Service Employees International Union, has demonstrated the
appeal of its message, with minimum wage increases succeeding even in
Republican-leaning states like Arizona. 40 Unions are likely to continue backing
similar campaigns involving wage increases, paid sick and safe leave, and
predictable scheduling practices. Further, in anticipation of Friedrichs being
decided adversely to labor unions, many public sector unions began successful
“internal organizing” campaigns, appealing to represented workers to become
union members. 41 Unions will need to build on these experiences.
While the American labor movement faces enormous challenges in the
Trump era, I remain optimistic that the core union message of worker rights,
voice, and empowerment will continue to resonate with the American public. 42
The problem riddling organized labor’s leaders and grassroots activists is how
to translate the popularity of this message into lasting pro-worker policies.
With committed opponents in the federal government, that struggle becomes
exponentially more difficult, as unions will have to play defense in the federal
courts and keep pressure on congressional democrats to mount a unified
resistance against their republican colleagues and executive branch initiatives,
all while pushing for new wins in states, cities, and individual workplaces. This
may prove to be the most challenging political era for unions since before the
New Deal, but labor should view the more promising picture at the state level
as a proving ground for its ideas and priorities.

39 For an account of the labor movement’s role in advocating for improvements in minimum labor
standards, see generally Kate Andrias, The New Labor Law, 126 YALE L.J. 2 (2016).
40 Arizona Minimum Wage and Paid Time Off, Proposition 206, BALLTOPIA (2016), https://ballotpedia.
org/Arizona_Minimum_Wage_and_Paid_Time_Off,_Proposition_206_(2016).
41 See Internal Organizing,AFSCME http://www.afscme.org/members/conventions/resolutions-andamendments/1988/resolutions/67-internal-organizing.
42 See Bruce Drake, Opinion of Unions is Up, Membership Down, Pew Research Center, Sept. 2, 2013
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2013/09/02/opinion-of-unions-is-up-membership-down/.

